Asymmetric information

Results: 1016



#Item
51Impatience vs. Incentives Marcus Opp John Zhu  University of California, Berkeley (Haas) & University of Pennsylvania, Wharton

Impatience vs. Incentives Marcus Opp John Zhu University of California, Berkeley (Haas) & University of Pennsylvania, Wharton

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Source URL: faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-02-26 11:17:45
52Abstract We study a principal-agent model in which the (effort-dependent) realization of output levels is ambiguous, and the agent is ambiguity averse (while the principal is ambiguity neutral). We show that introducing

Abstract We study a principal-agent model in which the (effort-dependent) realization of output levels is ambiguous, and the agent is ambiguity averse (while the principal is ambiguity neutral). We show that introducing

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Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-18 06:35:26
53Microsoft Word - SFB_Newsletter_03-2012_final.docx

Microsoft Word - SFB_Newsletter_03-2012_final.docx

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Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de

Language: English - Date: 2015-05-21 10:28:51
54vonLilienfeld-Toal_Mookherjee_Figures_Edited.dvi

vonLilienfeld-Toal_Mookherjee_Figures_Edited.dvi

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Source URL: people.bu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-06-17 16:32:53
55NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES  DOES PRIVATE INFORMATION INFLUENCE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PURCHASE DECISIONS? Frank A. Sloan Patricia A. Robinson

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES DOES PRIVATE INFORMATION INFLUENCE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PURCHASE DECISIONS? Frank A. Sloan Patricia A. Robinson

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Source URL: www.nber.org

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-13 15:38:04
56Principal-agent dynamics David Zetland Global Challenges: Prosperity LUC ∼ 15 Feb 2016

Principal-agent dynamics David Zetland Global Challenges: Prosperity LUC ∼ 15 Feb 2016

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Source URL: www.kysq.org

Language: English - Date: 2016-02-21 09:37:45
57Signals, cues and meaning Judith Donath draft: do not circulate please send comments to   This chapter explains signaling theory, which is the basis for much of the analysis and

Signals, cues and meaning Judith Donath draft: do not circulate please send comments to This chapter explains signaling theory, which is the basis for much of the analysis and

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Source URL: vivatropolis.com

Language: English - Date: 2011-10-27 08:10:35
58Microsoft PowerPoint - 6_Moral Hazard and Adverse Selction

Microsoft PowerPoint - 6_Moral Hazard and Adverse Selction

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Source URL: www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2006-11-20 08:41:14
59Universität Mannheim · DMannheim  Summer School 2015 Bronnbach Monastery, August 2 – August 7  Empirical Analysis of Markets with Asymmetric Information

Universität Mannheim · DMannheim Summer School 2015 Bronnbach Monastery, August 2 – August 7 Empirical Analysis of Markets with Asymmetric Information

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Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de

Language: English - Date: 2015-05-21 10:15:14
60THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF DECISION RIGHTS IN ORGANIZATIONS∗ AND  EXIT

THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF DECISION RIGHTS IN ORGANIZATIONS∗ AND EXIT

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Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2016-06-05 05:01:51